ABSTRACT Motivated by the dense coding and teleportation of two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state, a continuous-variable arbitrated quantum signature (CV-AQS) scheme is proposed. The signer Alice generates the signature by the dense coding and sends it to the verifier Bob. The measurement results of two quadrature components serve for the recovery of the secret message. With the help of the arbitrator Charlie, Bob verifies the validity of the signature. The security of the presented protocol is protected by the calculation of the fidelity parameter and the implementation process of two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state teleportation. Moreover, the proposed scheme can be correctly implemented in the lossy and lossless transmission with a higher capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signature is a basic algorithm of classical cryptography, which is widely applied in e-commerce and e-government. It can ensure the integrity of the information transmission and prevent the repudiation. However, the classical digital signature algorithm such as RSA, which rely on the difficulty of the factoring large numbers, will completely fail in the face of powerful quantum computers [1] . The application of the quantum technology in the field of communication can easily solve this problem, which mainly depends on the uncertainty principle of quantum states. However, Barnum et al. [2] claimed that the direct signature of a quantum messages is impossible, which is called ''no-go theorem of quantum signatures''. Fortunately, Zeng et al. [3] proposed an arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) based on GreenbergerHorne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state in 2002. It avoids the ''no-go theorem of quantum signatures'' and has been proved to be theoretically feasible. Since then, many signature protocols based on the structure of AQS have been studied by scholars.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Chien-Ming Chen. In 2009, Li et al. [4] proposed an AQS scheme based on the Bell states instead of the GHZ states. It reduces the complexity of the scheme. In 2010, Zou and Qiu [5] proposed a simplified AQS scheme without any entangled states, which provided an approach against Bob's denial. In 2015, Li and Shi [6] proposed an AQS scheme based on a chained CNOT operations encryption, which used a new encryption technology instead of the quantum one-time pad (QOTP) algorithm. Furthermore, researchers proposed various branches of quantum signature schemes in different scenarios based on the idea of AQS, such as quantum blind signatures [7] - [10] , quantum group signatures [11] - [15] , quantum dual signatures [16] , [17] , quantum proxy signature [18] , quantum homomorphic signature [19] etc.
So far, quantum signature can be further classified into two categories, i.e., discrete-variable arbitrated quantum signature (DV-AQS) and continuous-variable arbitrated quantum signature (CV-AQS). The DV-AQS protocols which are implemented by the polarization direction of a single photon has yielded many results. Nevertheless, the disadvantages of DV quantum cryptography such as the difficulties of generation and detection, limit the transmission distance and efficiency. The CV quantum states, such as the coherent states and squeezed states, could be easily generated and operated by the linear optical components. The CV quantum cryptography scheme is implemented by applying the amplitude and the phase quadrature components of optical modes. Furthermore, it could transmit information with higher efficiency compared with DV quantum states. Therefore, it could greatly improve the channel capacity [20] . Due to the advantages of CV quantum states, scholars have proposed a number of CV quantum communication protocols. For instance, CV quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) [21] - [23] , CV quantum teleportation [24] - [27] , CV quantum secret sharing [28] - [30] , and CV quantum identity authentication [31] etc. The CV-AQS protocols [32] , [33] are proposed, which show superior performance in terms of generation and detection over the DV-AQS. We analyze them and find some problems and shortages. First, their encryption technologies are similar to QOTP, which has been considered to be insecure in AQS [33] , [34] . Second, they did not make full use of the channel capacity of the CV quantum state, e.g., each quantum state only transmits 1 or 2 bits message.
Inspired by the characteristics of the dense coding and teleportation of quantum two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) states [35] , [36] , we propose a CV-AQS scheme. Specifically, TMSV state pairs are employed to provide the entanglement resources for teleportation. Furthermore, CV coherent states as well as the principle of dense coding serve as the carrier of the signature and message. Compared to the previous CV-AQS [32] , [33] , we consider the transmission loss in the practical channels. With the help of the arbitrator, the verifier checks the integrality and authenticity of the signature by calculating the value of the fidelity parameters, which consists of the amplitude and the phase quadrature components. Furthermore, the signature channel capacities of the schemes are analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, the principle of the dense coding and quantum teleportation based on TMSV state is described. In section 3, the AQS scheme is described by three phases, i.e. the initial phase, the signing phase, and the verification phase. In section 4, we analyze the security of the AQS scheme including the nondisavowal and the non-forgery. In section 5, we explain the performance analysis of our scheme. Finally, a brief conclusion is given in section 6.
II. THE CONTINUOUS VARIABLE QUANTUM TELEPORTATION AND DENSE CODING A. TWO-MODE SQUEEZED VACUUM (TMSV) STATE
In general, two canonical quantum quadrature components of a single-mode electromagnetic field are denoted as X = 4 . The preparation of TMSV can be completed by sending two independent vacuum states through a nondegenerate optical parametric amplifier (NOPA).
The entanglement resourceâ out1 andâ out2 are derived by implementing a two-mode squeezing operatorŜ(r) on each of two vacuum input modesâ in1 andâ in2 , i.e.,
, r is the squeezed parameter which is related to the entanglement degree of the TMSV state. The entangled relationship of these two optical modes is denoted as
Here, we assume that two input optical modes obey a Gaussian distribution, i.e.,
. Accordingly, the variance of the canonical quadrature components about the output entangled optical modes is computed by
When the squeeze parameter r → ∞, the value of 1 2 e −2r equals to 0, which means that X out1 = X out2 and P out1 = −P out2 .
B. CONTINUOUS VARIABLE QUANTUM TELEPORTATION
Suppose that two parties of communication Alice and Bob employ TMSV states and implement operators on each input as shown in Eq. (1) . Alice holds the modeâ out1 and Bob holds the modeâ out2 . By taking the joint Bell-state measurements and announcing the classical results, Alice transmits the prepared quantum coherent state |X A + iP A to Bob. The measurement results of two quadrature components are denoted as
Bob applies the corresponding operation and gets
When the squeeze parameter r → ∞, the values of X A and X B are infinitely close, i.e., X B = X A , P B = P A . It implies that Bob can recover the original message. If X A = P A , we can learn the message no matter which component is measured. 
C. CONTINUOUS VARIABLE QUANTUM DENSE CODING
Quantum dense coding is an efficient coding scheme, which allows one to use prior maximal entanglement to send two bits of classical information by the physical transfer of a single encoded qubit. In DV dense coding [37] , [38] , Alice and Bob shares a pair of entangled states
. Then, Alice operates one of four unitary transformations on the particle A in her hand, two bits message can be transmitted. The CV dense coding is first proposed by Braunstein and Kimble [36] . The general formalism to characterize CV dense coding can be described as follows.
Alice and Bob share a pair of TMSV statesâ out3 andâ out4 as Eq. (2), where the quadrature components of the two input modes obey the Gaussian distribution:
. Suppose that Alice wants to transmit two classical decimal numbers α x , α p ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) to Bob, she operates on the one mode of TMSVâ out3 with the displacement operator D(α), and obtains a coherent state in modeâ out5 , i.e.,
where α = α x +iα p . Then, Alice sends her optical modeâ out5 to Bob. After receiving encoded states, Bob sendsâ out4 and a out5 through the detection system. The Bell-state detection system consists of a 50/50 beam splitter and two balanced homodyne detectors D 1 and D 2 as shown in Fig.1 . Afterward, Bob takes the quadrature measurements on each output modes. The measurement outcomes are related to
According to Eq. (3), when r → ∞, X out3 = X out4 and P out3 = −P out4 , so X = α x and P = α p . The schematic of CV quantum dense coding is depicted in Fig.1 .
III. CONTINUOUS VARIABLE ARBITRATED QUANTUM SIGNATURE SCHEME
In our protocol, there are three parties which include a signer, a verifier and an arbitrator. The signer party named Alice prepares the classical original message. She generates the signature using the shared key. At the same time, she transmits the message to the verifier named Bob by teleportation. After receiving the encrypted signature and the message, Bob verifies the validity of the signature with the help of the arbitrator named Charlie. If the signature is true, Bob checks the integrality of the message. There are classical and quantum channels in communication of our scheme, which are authenticated by current error correction and privacy amplification technologies [39] . In this section, we are ready to introduce our scheme which consists of the following three phases: the initial phase, the signing phase and the verification phase. The schematic of the CV-AQS scheme is depicted in Fig.2 .
A. INITIAL PHASE
Step 1 Alice and Bob share their secret keys K a = k a +ik a and
where k a and k b are decimal numbers. Moreover, Alice generates a random secret key R.
Step 2 Charlie generates two pairs of TMSV optical modes (â 1 ,â 2 ) and (â 3 ,â 4 ), where (â 1 ,â 2 ) are used for the teleportaion and (â 3 ,â 4 ) for the signature. Then, Charlie sends the modesâ 1 andâ 3 to Alice, the modeâ 2 to Bob, and the modê a 4 in his own hands.
B. SIGNATURE PHASE
Step 1 
Step 2 Alice encrypts the message m to obtain m = m x + im p , where
where E K a is a substitution encryption algorithm such as the S-Box in AES algorithm [40] . Based on the principle of the CV dense coding as described in Sec.II-C, Alice modulates the amplitude and the phase quadrature components of the optical modeâ 3 with the displacement operatorD(m + K a ) to obtain the signatureâ 5 , i.e.,
Step 3 Alice performs a joint Bell-state measurement on a 0 andâ 1 , and gets the results of the amplitude difference X u and the phase sum P u ,
Step 4 Alice sends (â 5 , m , X u , P u ) to Bob. VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Schematic of the CV-AQS scheme.
C. VERIFICATION PHASE
Step 1 After receiving (â 5 , m , X u , P u ) from Alice, Bob performs the displacement operator on the signatureâ 5 with the secret key K b . The function of the encryption is expressed aŝ
Subsequently, Bob sends (â 6 , m ) to Charlie.
Step 2 Charlie applies the Bell-state detection with two inputs ofâ 6 andâ 4 . Afterward, Charlie takes the quadrature measurements on each output mode, and obtains ( X , P) as follow,
Charlie encrypts m using the key K a as Eq. (9) and obtains (m x , m p ). Then, he calculates
and gets the value of the fidelity parameters H , i.e.,
Charlie chooses a parameter t to indicate whether the signature is valid, i.e.,
Here, H tr is a threshold value, which shows the tolerance of deviation between the transmitted message and the recovered message. In the ideal case, there are lossless channels between the participants. We can set H tr = 0, i.e., X = X and P = P . Consequently, Charlie considers that the message and the signature transmitted by Bob (â 6 , m ) did not be affected by the potential attackers in the case of H x = H tr . In the nonideal case, Charlie consider that quantum states will be affected by practical imperfections, and the value of H tr will be greater than 0. Afterwards, Charlie sends (â 6 , m , t) back to Bob.
Step 3 Bob checks the value of t. If t = 0, Bob confirms the signature is invalid and terminates the scheme, otherwise he performs a corresponding unitary transformation on the optical modeâ 2 based on the measurement results X u and P u . Then he randomly measures the amplitude and the phase quadrature components, where
According to the principle described in Eq. (5) and H p will be greater than H tr in the verification phase. Bob will reject it based on t = 0. In the worst case, Eve obtains K a and K b , the forgery is still impossible without (X u , P u ), which is transmitted via an authenticated classical channel. Therefore, the message cannot be recovered perfectly and the equality X B = P B = m x + m p will not be obtained.
There is a much stronger attacker, who carries out the scheme as a participant. As the verifier of the scheme, Bob cannot get Alice's key K a to forge a valid signature. However, Bob can perform an existing attack [5] . Specifically, Bob modifies the signature without knowing K a before Charlie's verification. We show the details of this strategy as below.
Obviously, there is a very strong correlation between two elements of the signature, which are shown asâ 5 and m . After receivingâ 5 and m , Bob performs a displacement operator D(ξ ) onâ 5 as well as the correspond addition operations on m . Bob could get another couple of elements denoted aŝ
and
where the complex number ξ = ξ x + iξ p is the forged part of Bob, ξ x = 0 and ξ p = 0. Then Bob sends (â 8 , M ) to Charlie, whereâ
In the ideal case, the transmission channels between the participants are lossless. Charlie applies the Bell-state detection to measure the quadratures ofâ 6 . He sendsâ 8 andâ 4 as the inputs of the beam splitter and takes the quadrature measurements on each output modes. The measurement results are
under the condition that the squeeze parameter r → ∞.
To verify the validity of the signature, Charlie encrypts M using K a as shown in Eq. (9) . He obtains the real part and the imaginary part of E K a (M ), which are denoted as Re(E K a (M )) and Im(E K a (M )), i.e.,
According to the substitution encryption algorithm described in Eq. (9), it is obtained that 
C. IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISAVOWAL FOR THE RECEIVER
In classical digital signature protocols, the feature of non-disavowal is beneficial to the practical applications.
In general, it demands Bob cannot deny the receiving of the documents, which include the message as well as the signature. Firstly, the receiving of the signatureâ 5 in our protocol cannot be disavowed by Bob. The fundamental reason is that Bob has to ask the assistance of the arbitrator for verification. Secondly, Bob may deny the receiving of the message m or claim that X B = m x + m p or P B = m x + m p in the case of t = 1 to deny the integrality of the original message m after the arbitrator's verification. Then, he rejects Alice's signature (â 5 , m) even if it is valid. Fortunately, in our scheme, the original message m has been encrypted into the secret message m with the random key R in step 1 of the signing phase. That is to say, if Bob wants to deny the validity of the (â 5 , m), he should inform Alice to announce the random key R to get the original message m. However, once Bob asks Alice to announce the key R, it means that Bob has already acknowledged that he has received the message.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES A. PRACTICAL INFLUENCE ON THE VERIFICATION THRESHOLD VALUE
In verification phase, the arbitrator Charlie calculates the value of H x and H p . Afterward, he compares the above two parameters with the threshold value H tr . In the lossless channel, there isn't any noise, we can set H tr = 0. However, in practical communications, the quantum channels are always lossy and noisy. The approach applied in the lossy channel is different from the one in the lossless channel. Here, we define that the transmission coefficient is η and the thermal noise of the transmitting channel between Alice and Bob isâ N 1 . The signature transmitted to Bob can be expressed aŝ
The two quadrature components ofâ
. Bob encryptsâ 5 with the VOLUME 7, 2019
key K b and sends it to Charlie. We define that the thermal noise of the transmitting channel between Bob and Charlie iŝ a N 2 . The optical mode received by Charlie can be described aŝ
where the two quadrature components ofâ N 2 follow the Gaussian distribution X N 2 , P N 2 ∼ N (0, V N 2 ). To measure the amplitude and the phase quadrature components ofâ 6 , the modeâ 4 needs to be modulated by Charlie, i.e.,
Afterward, Charlie takes the quadrature measurements on each output modes, and obtains the results ( X , P) from the 50/50 beam splitter shown as
For simplicity, we assume that
The threshold value can be obtained by calculating the variance of the amplitude quadrature component as follows
It can be deduced that the lower bound H tr = (1 − η 2 )V N will be achieved if r is a infinite value. Thus, there is always H tr > 0 in the lossy channel. If Bob wants to forge a valid signature, he will counterfeit a private key k a , which is hard to be same as k a . It can be calculated that Similarly, if Eve is an external attacker who try to forge Alice's signature, he will obtain the fallacious secret keys k a and k b . It can be calculated that
The dependence of H tr , H Bob and H Eve on r is shown in Fig. 3 with the same parameters η = 0.8, σ = 1 and V N = 1. As is shown in Fig.3 , with the growth of the squeezed parameter r, the threshold value tends to be stable. Moreover, there always exists H tr < H Bob < H Eve , which implies that Charlie can also verify the validity of the signature by the Eq.(16) in the lossy channel.
B. SIGNATURE CHANNEL CAPACITY
It is given by Shannon information theory [41] that the relation between the upper limit of channel information transmission rate (bit per second), the channel signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the bandwidth. When the signal obeys the Gaussian distribution, the optimum mutual information (C) of a noisy transmission channel can be calculated as
where S N is the SNR. In our protocol,â 6 is transmitted in a noisy transmission channel, which the SNR of the amplitude and the phase signals is
85724 VOLUME 7, 2019 We assume that σ = 1 and r → ∞, the total mutual information C can be calculated by the sum of the amplitude and the phase quadrature components, i.e., Fig.4 depicts the relation of the capacity C and the transmission coefficient η. In the lossy channel, the capacity C increases with the growth of the transmission coefficient η. It is obtained that the capacity of our scheme is greater than 2 when the transmission coefficient η > 0.681 in the case of r → ∞. Moreover, the channel capacity C is higher with a greater entanglement degree of the TMSV state (denoted as r).
As is shown in Table 1 , we compare the signature capacity of our scheme with DV-AQS protocols and other CV-AQS protocols [32] , [33] . The transmission coefficient η in the lossy channel is less than the one in the lossless channel. Fortunately, the capacity of our scheme is greater than the other works when the transmission coefficient η > 0.681. In other words, it can obtain higher channel capacity with lower the transmission coefficient.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced an AQS protocol based on the technologies of CV dense coding and teleportation. With two pairs of TMSV optical modes, a signatory Alice generates a private signature and sends the private message to the verifier Bob. Bob checks the authenticity and the integrality of the signature with the aid of the arbitrator Charlie. The analysis of the CV-AQS scheme illustrates that the signature cannot be denied or forged. Specially, we provide the values of the fidelity parameter H under the different attack strategies, which can be used for the signature verification in lossy and lossless channel. Furthermore, the performance analysis illustrates that the channel capacity of the CV-AQS protocol is expanded with a greater transmission coefficient. 
